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Abstract
Scholars of legal mobilization have long explored how litigation is used
as a resource for social and political change. While most studies focus on the
actions of private groups, this article considers law enforcement as a form of
legal mobilization. Employing a case study of recent pharmaceutical litigation,
this article examines how prosecutors have mobilized the law to reshape
corporate responsibilities in the prescription drug industry. Prosecutors'
litigation campaigns have forced changes in organizational practices,
expanded the scope of the conflict over pharmaceutical industry actions, and
established new legal norms that have spread throughout the political system.
This form of prosecutor-led legal mobilization has occurred in other contexts
as well, including gun control and mortgage lending. In addition to indicating
how lawyers within the state can engage in a form of cause lawyering, the
government litigation explored in this article illustrates both the instrumental
and constitutive power of the law.
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Introduction
The mobilization of law for social and political reform has long
been a central topic in the study of law and society (Zemans 1983;
Epp 1998; Albiston 1999; Barnes & Burke 2012). Studies of legal
mobilization have typically focused on how private individuals and
groups, such as civil rights and environmental organizations, use legal
resources against the state. This focus reflects the "bottom-up"
approach to the study of law employed by numerous legal mobilization
studies (McCann 1994; Ewick & Silbey 1998; Paris 2010). While these
studies often adopt a narrative of private groups against the state,
however, powerful legal actors within the state have also mobilized the
law in ways mirroring the efforts of social movements. These efforts
have transformed existing political arrangements and reshaped
corporate practices in order to address policy demands left unmet by
other parts of the state.
In this article, I consider how government prosecutors,
especially state attorneys general and their federal counterparts in the
U.S. Department of Justice, have employed litigation as a form of legal
mobilization. My examination centers on a substantively important,
though little studied, recent litigation campaign: government litigation
against the pharmaceutical industry. Over several years, state and
federal prosecutors succeeded in re-framing widely accepted
pharmaceutical industry practices into what policymakers and the
public now perceive as a massive fraudulent conspiracy operated by
drug companies. This effort, arising in an era of growing concern about
health care costs, was a reaction to congressional unwillingness to
change the way the government paid for prescription drugs through
Medicare and Medicaid. By using innovative legal arguments,
prosecutors employed the law to achieve significant nationwide
changes throughout the multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical industry.
While this article focuses mainly on pharmaceutical litigation, legal
mobilization by government prosecutors is a phenomenon that has
appeared in several other contemporary contexts. Near the conclusion,
I draw attention to two additional cases, gun control and reform of
mortgage lending practices, which have followed patterns similar to
that of the pharmaceutical litigation.
Government-led litigation is of interest to socio-legal scholars
for several reasons. For one, this study suggests that law enforcement
can be an important form of legal mobilization. Apart from the role of
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public prosecutors in the tobacco litigation of the 1990s, which spurred
several important studies (Mather 1998; Derthick 2001; McCann,
Haltom & Fisher 2013), scholars have generally overlooked
government litigation as a political reform strategy. This is largely
because mobilization studies tend to focus on non-state actors and
because government litigation campaigns have unfolded over long
periods rather than being resolved in landmark court cases. By tracing
a sustained reform-oriented litigation campaign by public prosecutors,
my article contributes to recent scholarship examining the role of
activist government lawyers (Berenson 2009; NeJaime 2012) and
responds to calls that greater attention be paid to complex litigation
and mobilization by powerful actors (McCann 2008:535).
The activity examined in this article also illustrates that the
distinction between "outsider" groups seeking to reform institutions
and the "insiders" residing within those organizations is often blurred.
While previous law and society scholarship has emphasized this point
(Katzenstein 1998), most studies of "institutional insiders" who
attempt to reform their own organizations focus on non-state insiders
such as those within corporations (Raeburn 2004) and schools (Binder
2002). Meanwhile, the relationship between government actors and
outsider activism is typically discussed in terms of "elite alliances" or
elite support (McCann 1994). "The state" typically appears as a
monolithic actor that reacts with varying levels of support or resistance
to pressure from outsider movements. This article suggests, however,
that the role of government actors in the process of legal mobilization
can stretch beyond simply providing "support" for outsider movements
by initiating challenges to other parts of the state to which they
belong. These challenges often enlist other allies within the state –
especially federal agencies – but do so in the context of challenging
existing government policy. This helps illustrate that the role of "the
state" in processes of legal mobilization is more complex and
differentiated than often portrayed.
Further, government-driven legal mobilization illustrates the
effectiveness of law-based reform, in contrast to scholarly skeptics
(Rosenberg 1991, 2008). Prosecutors' use of the law has altered the
political status quo in numerous direct and indirect ways, significantly
affecting the practices of several of America's largest industries.
Prosecutors have used threats of lawsuits to reach settlements with
industry defendants that create regulatory requirements not otherwise

Law & Social Inquiry, Vol 40, No. 1 (Winter 2015): pg. 123-151. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley.

3

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

required under existing law. This litigation has also served to alter the
political status quo in more subtle ways, including reshaping existing
legal norms and creating new avenues for coordinated legal activism.
Finally, this study forges a link between interbranch studies of
law and courts and legal mobilization scholarship. Both of these areas
share much common ground despite largely operating in two separate
scholarly spheres. An increasing number of law and courts scholars
have challenged the tendency of legal studies to have an excessively
narrow focus on the formal decisions of courts, especially the U.S.
Supreme Court, without contextualizing these decisions in the broader
landscape of institutional activity. Barnes, for example, highlights the
importance of "microinstitutional analysis" that seeks to understand
how continuously unfolding legal processes operate simultaneously
across multiple political institutions (2007:33). This interbranch
approach helps illustrate how major changes in law and public policy
result from subtle institutional interactions over time. Given that law
and society scholarship has long recognized that law's importance
stretches well beyond decisions of the Supreme Court, the interbranch
perspective and law and society scholarship have much in common.
The emergence of law enforcement as a form of legal mobilization
offers much of interest to scholars in both camps, and responds to
calls for more linkages between scholarship studying complex
organizations and studies focusing on social movements (Davis et al.
2005).

Law Enforcement as Legal Mobilization
Scholars have generally examined legal mobilization by adopting
either an instrumental perspective emphasizing how law directly
influences society "by imposing external sanctions and inducements"
or a constitutive perspective that draws attention to the role of law in
"shaping internal meanings and creating new statuses" (Mather
1998:900; Sarat & Kearns 1993; McCann 1994; McCann 2008). These
perspectives need not be mutually exclusive, however. Particularly
since the late 1990s, government prosecutors have employed criminal
and civil lawsuits as a way to not simply "enforce the law" but to
change it in ways that straddle the line between these instrumental
and constitutive perspectives.

Law & Social Inquiry, Vol 40, No. 1 (Winter 2015): pg. 123-151. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley.

4

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

The best known example of this dynamic occurred in the late
1990s, when state attorneys general (AGs) across the nation led a
litigation campaign against tobacco companies. This litigation resulted
in a $206 billion Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), which to date
remains the largest civil settlement in American history. The MSA,
which followed the failure of comprehensive tobacco regulation in
Congress, established a host of new tobacco advertising regulations,
industry lobbying restrictions, and new de facto taxes on cigarettes
(Derthick 2001). Mather's study of this litigation revealed the ways in
which it had both direct and indirect effects by serving as a method of
agenda setting and issue framing (Mather 1998). McCann, Haltom, and
Fisher likewise examine the instrumental and constitutive dimensions
of tobacco litigation in their study of how tobacco firms were
"criminalized" over time, though with the suggestion that the process
they trace may be limited to the peculiar politics of tobacco (2013:30).
Since the tobacco litigation, however, government attorneys
have used lawsuits and legal settlements across a wide range of
industries – including the multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical industry –
with the goal of fundamentally changing the way that these corporate
organizations operate. Much like the tobacco litigation, this activity has
involved one part of the state (government prosecutors) attempting to
employ the law in order to change the policy status quo supported by
another part of the state (particularly the policy choices of Congress). I
suggest that they have done so in three main ways.
First, prosecutors' pharmaceutical litigation had the direct effect
of forcing organizational change by using out-of-court settlements as a
mechanism for imposing external sanctions on corporate
organizations. This approach is consistent with the longstanding
recognition of the importance of "bargaining in the shadow of the law"
(Mnookin & Kornhauser 1979). The prospect of avoiding the
substantial costs of active litigation explains why disputants often
bargain in the shadow of the law rather than relying upon official legal
actors to make decisions binding on both parties (McCann 2006:514).
Recent government litigation illustrates this process at work.
Prosecutors have used threats of additional litigation costs and bad
publicity to persuade companies to enter settlements that
fundamentally alter their corporate obligations. Additionally, these
settlements have served as a way to "legalize accountability" in
targeted industries. Epp explains how activists mobilized the law to
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force local government bureaucracies to adopt new written rules,
employee training programs, and new structures of managerial
oversight in order to foster greater institutional compliance with
emerging legal norms (2009). Government-led settlements between
government litigators and corporations have included similar
mechanisms, with the aim of reforming the internal operations of
corporate defendants as a means to ensure compliance with the
prosecutors' newly created legal requirements.
Second, prosecutors' legal mobilization campaigns have served
as a vehicle to expand the scope of the conflict over corporate
activities by attracting other parties to the conflict over pharmaceutical
prices. E.E. Schattschneider suggested that the "central political fact in
a free society is the tremendous contagiousness of conflict" (1960:2).
How a particular conflict is resolved, he argued, will depend largely on
the breadth of its scope. Political disputes that draw in additional
participants and adequately "socialize" conflict are more likely to have
an impact on the existing political status quo (ibid: 7). Expanding the
scope of the conflict is particularly important for those on the losing
side of a conflict; "it is the loser who calls in outside help" (ibid:16).
Several government litigation campaigns have sought to alter the
political status quo after failed attempts to achieve these goals in
other, more typical, policy-making venues. After initiating a law-based
alternative method of policy change, prosecutors sought to expand the
scope of the conflict by allying with several other actors. This has
included other actors within the state, particularly bureaucratic
agencies, as well as external actors such as advocacy groups and
class-action attorneys.
Third, this government-led litigation has had the constitutive
effect of establishing new legal norms transforming existing
understandings of key concepts such as "fraud." Scholars of social
movements have noted the importance of "discursive opportunity
structures" to the success of efforts for political change. For particular
claims to gain public visibility, resonate with policymakers, and gain
legitimacy, groups must frame their claims in a way that connects with
widely accepted beliefs in society (Ferree, et al. 2002). Effective
framing choices designed to challenge the status quo "must take into
account and be shaped by the specific features of the complicated
landscape on which they compete" (ibid.: 71). Claims that do not link
with available discursive opportunities may face significant constraints
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as compared to those framed in more "acceptable" ways. In several of
their litigation campaigns, prosecutors have framed the underlying
changes to the status quo as necessary to prevent "fraud" and "lawbreaking," thus adopting frames that made success more likely than
previous efforts to achieve reform. These characterizations resonated
across the political spectrum and helped shift the conflict away from
polarized debates operating under frames less amenable to altering
the status quo.
The rise of government law enforcement to force organizational
change, expand the scope of conflict, and establish new legal norms
has occurred parallel to two broader developments in contemporary
American politics: increasing congressional gridlock and the attack on
private litigation. Divided government and increased political
polarization have made traditional policy making more difficult, leading
policy advocates to resort to "unorthodox lawmaking" (Sinclair 2011).
Though Sinclair uses this phrase to discuss the development of new
legislative procedures, the notion of unorthodox lawmaking also
captures the turn to alternative methods of policy change, including
the courts and legal mobilization. At the same time that policy
advocates have turned to these other ways to achieve policymaking,
however, the role of private litigation in American society has become
more controversial. Concerns about an alleged "litigation explosion" in
America prompted Congress and the federal courts to curtail
opportunities for private litigators to bring lawsuits against
corporations (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005; Wal-Mart v. Dukes;
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion).
As achieving policy change through typical policy-making
institutions has become more difficult and private litigators have faced
more roadblocks in their efforts to employ the law, government
prosecutors have become a focal point for efforts to mobilize the law
to alter the political status quo. I now turn to one of the most
prominent of these efforts: reform of pharmaceutical industry practices
through law enforcement.1

The Politics of Pharmaceuticals
The effort by government prosecutors to mobilize the law as an
instrument of pharmaceutical industry reform has received surprisingly
little attention among scholars of law and politics despite the salience
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and contentiousness of health care policy in contemporary American
politics. In 2010, total health care spending represented about 18
percent of the United States' entire gross domestic product, up from
13.8 percent as recently as 2000 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012).
Expenditures on prescription drugs, which reached $307 billion
nationally in 2010 (Gatyas 2011), have been a significant part of this
overall spending. Americans have faced some of the highest
prescription drug prices in the world for years, with pharmaceutical
costs rising much faster than general health care inflation (Danzon and
Furukawa 2008).
Throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, lawmakers and
activists began focusing on allegedly unscrupulous drug industry
practices as a driver of high pharmaceutical costs. For example,
Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA), one of the industry's biggest
critics, argued early in the 1990s that "unless the industry can provide
an adequate explanation for these price hikes, one can only conclude
that what is going on is greed on a massive scale" (Rovner 1992).
Groups such as the AARP emphasized the impact of pharmaceutical
company practices on the pocketbooks of the poor and elderly (Pear
2002). Other advocacy organizations argued that rapidly rising health
care costs violated basic tenets of justice and fairness. Community
Catalyst, founded in 1997 as the "voice for consumers in health care
reform," cited rising drug costs as a major obstacle to its goal of
guaranteed access to high quality, affordable health care for all
(Community Catalyst).
For years, advocacy groups and their legislative allies sought to
combat alleged drug company "greed" through legislation aimed at
controlling prescription drug prices. Several proposals sought to
eliminate tax subsidies for drug companies and provide a combination
of carrots and sticks to ensure that increases in drug prices remained
in line with overall inflation (Medication Price Control Act of 1991;
Prescription Drug Cost Containment Act of 1992). These efforts
appeared to receive a major boost with the election of President Bill
Clinton, who in 1993 announced a plan that would expand drug
coverage provided under government health care programs while also
attempting to control pharmaceutical inflation. Among other ideas,
Clinton proposed a new National Health Board tasked with
investigating "unreasonable" drug prices. Borrowing a popular idea
from industry critics, Clinton also proposed allowing the Secretary of
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Health and Human Services (HHS) to negotiate with pharmaceutical
companies over drug prices paid for by the government (Freudenheim
1993).
Despite a two-year window in which Democrats enjoyed unified
control of Congress and the presidency, however, these legislative
attempts to expand government regulation over the pharmaceutical
industry failed. Representatives from drug companies denounced
Clinton's pharmaceutical proposals as an attempt to achieve price
controls on prescription drugs that would "slow down or eliminate the
volume of research" on new drug innovation (ibid). When the 1994
elections gave Republicans control of both houses of Congress, the
prospects for pharmaceutical pricing reform looked bleak. Clinton's
push for reform had failed even with a Democratic Congress, and it
was unlikely that the new conservative majority would pursue strict
government regulation of drug companies. Advocates for lower drug
prices continued pursuing other ways to control drug costs, such as
allowing the re-importation of prescription drugs from Canada, where
pharmaceutical prices are lower because of direct government price
controls (Prescription Drug Parity Act of 1999). The efforts, like those
before them, foundered on concerns that government intervention
would damage private sector innovation.

Efforts to Reform the "Average Wholesale Price"
System
Amidst these failed legislative efforts, an alternative route to
reform pharmaceutical industry practices involved changing how
government health care programs pay for prescription drug coverage.
At the center of these efforts were attempted reforms of a drug pricing
system known as "Average Wholesale Price" (AWP). Since shortly after
the creation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, AWP has served as the
pricing benchmark the government uses to pay for drugs covered by
these programs. Pharmaceutical companies do not receive government
reimbursements directly under Medicare and Medicaid, but instead
make money by selling pharmaceuticals to health care providers.
These providers include pharmacies that dispense drugs to patients, as
well as doctors and hospitals that purchase physician-administered
drugs directly from pharmaceutical companies for use at doctors'
offices or in the hospital outpatient setting. The government then
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reimburses the providers according to the AWP for each prescribed
drug.
In theory, the AWP is supposed to reflect the average price
providers pay drug companies for prescription drugs. The AWP,
however, has no statutory definition. Governments receive AWP
information for drugs from private commercial publishers of drug
pricing data, the most prominent being First DataBank. These
commercial publishers in turn receive the AWP pricing information
directly from manufacturers themselves (Gencarelli 2002:3). Figure 1
illustrates the crucial role of AWP in government reimbursements for
prescription drug coverage.
[Figure 1 about here]
The problem is that the AWP, despite its name, is not an
"average" price at all. Drug companies have discretion to set the AWPs
for their products themselves. The AWPs are often considerably higher
than the actual amount providers pay for drugs because the AWPs do
not reflect the many discounts drug companies offer providers as an
incentive to purchase their products. In this respect, the AWP is similar
to the "sticker price" for vehicles in the automobile industry. The
difference between this AWP sticker price and the actual price
providers pay for the drugs is known as the "spread." Because the
government reimburses providers based on the AWPs – and not the
actual amount drug companies charge providers for the drugs –
providers can make extra money by prescribing drugs with high
spreads. For example, a manufacturer might sell a physicianadministered drug to a doctor for 30 cents a dose, but set the AWP at
$1 a dose. The government would then reimburse the doctor $1 a
dose despite the doctor's actual cost being only 30 cents. The
physician thus pockets a profit of 70 cents for each dose (Pear 2001).
Drug companies, in turn, have the incentive to inflate their reported
AWPs so they can offer health care providers spreads higher than
those available for competing products.
The government has long been aware that these incentives
could drive up drug costs. As early as 1968, officials had noted that
increasing the spread between actual drug costs and the reported AWP
could be a way for drug companies to "maneuver against competing
products." As concerns about rising health care costs rose in the
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1990s, President Clinton noted the problems with the flawed, but legal,
AWP system. In a 1997 address calling for additional efforts to reduce
health care costs, Clinton described the AWP system as an example of
types of "waste and abuse" that "aren't even illegal [because] they're
just embedded in the practices of the system" (Spears & Pullman
2002:73). For years, the difference between AWP and the actual
market prices for drugs led pharmaceutical industry observers to refer
to AWP as "Ain't What's Paid" (Kalb, Bass, and Fabrikant 2001).
This issue was important to many other groups beyond
government officials. While AWP served as the main pricing benchmark
for government reimbursements, it also was the price private insurers
and health care plans used to determine reimbursements for
prescription drugs. This included Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance
associations, union health care plans, and self-insured employers
across the country (Gencarelli 2002:3). These groups, like the
government, had paid billions of dollars in prescription drug
reimbursements based upon AWP.
Despite the many concerns raised about AWP, Congress
continued the use of this manufacturer-reported benchmark. This was
largely because of lobbying efforts by physicians who argued that it
would be impossible for them to stay in business and serve Medicare
and Medicaid recipients without benefiting from the spread created by
the AWP (Carter 2002:44). According to these health care providers,
the spread helped to make up for losses due to inadequate
government payments for other services they provided under Medicare
and Medicaid. Further, the pharmacy industry claimed that the spread
enabled pharmacies to cover their costs in states where the stateprovided dispensing fees for Medicaid-covered prescriptions were
inadequate to cover the pharmacies' actual dispensing costs
(Gencarelli 2002:7).
Despite the convoluted nature of the AWP system, these
arguments convinced Congress to maintain AWP as the pricing
benchmark in government health care programs even in the face of
the Clinton Administration's significant push to change the system. In
his 1998 budget proposal, Clinton proposed eliminating AWP and
replacing it with a formula directly related to actual costs paid by
providers. Congress rejected this proposal, instead making much less
drastic changes to the drug reimbursement formula in the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997. The Administration subsequently fought for larger
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tweaks to the AWP payment system in both 1999 and 2000, but
neither of these proposals gained traction in Congress.

From Legislative Efforts to Legal Mobilization
Amidst these numerous failed legislative attempts to control
prescription drug costs, the locus of activity shifted from Congress to
the courtroom. The shift was similar to what was occurring in the
context of tobacco policy, where failures to achieve industry regulation
in Congress spurred the nation's AGs to work together on what would
become the Master Settlement Agreement. At the same time that
President Clinton was highlighting the potential of AWP in driving
higher drugs costs, federal and state prosecutors began collecting
information from leading pharmaceutical firms concerning their
prescription drug pricing strategies (Alpert 1997). This investigation
gradually blossomed into a full-scale litigation campaign in which
prosecutors, as with the tobacco litigation, made no secret that they
were attempting to alter practices in the pharmaceutical industry on a
national scale. As one member of the Florida AG's office put it, "the
goal is nothing less than changing the way the industry does business"
(Guiden 2001).

Forcing Organizational Change within Big Pharma
During their initial investigations, state and federal prosecutors
began characterizing as "fraudulent" the way in which drug companies
marketed the spread between AWP and actual costs to provide
incentives to providers for prescribing their products. Soon after, they
sought a settlement with a major drug manufacturer in the hope that
it would set a precedent for other companies to move away from the
use of AWP (Cloud & McGinley 2000). Central to the government
strategy was an innovative interpretation of the False Claims Act
("FCA"), a Civil War-era statute that originally aimed to crack down on
"rampant fraud" among defense contractors doing business with the
Union army (Krause 2004:65). According to the prosecutors,
marketing the spread represented illegal fraud under the FCA.
The suggestion that the AWP system, which even President
Clinton had acknowledged was legal, was actually fraudulent came as
a surprise to the pharmaceutical industry. Industry members observed
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that the government had known for years that marketing the spread
was an accepted industry practice and yet explicitly kept AWP as part
of the government reimbursement system. Nevertheless, the prospect
of FCA liability was particularly disturbing for pharmaceutical firms,
since every filled Medicare or Medicaid prescription could be a "false
claim" subject to treble damages and the maximum penalty under the
statute. These penalties could quickly add up to create potential
exposure to these firms running into hundreds of millions of dollars.
Additionally, if a company was found guilty of any criminal violations
involved in a potential suit, the company could be excluded from
Medicare and other federal health care programs. Given the share of
the overall pharmaceutical market that government programs
represent, this penalty is akin to a corporate "death sentence"
(Zalesky 2006). Under these conditions, drug companies realized that
litigating government claims all the way to a jury verdict would be
risky and potentially fatal.
The FCA cast a long shadow over the bargaining between
prosecutors and leading members of the industry. In January 2001,
the negotiating leverage prosecutors derived from the FCA paid off.
Since May of the previous year, prosecutors had been in talks with
Bayer Pharmaceuticals to resolve allegations that Bayer fraudulently
marketed the spread of its hemophilia and AIDS drugs. Under pressure
from threatened litigation and unwilling to risk a corporate "death
sentence" if found liable under the FCA, Bayer settled the
governments' allegations. In addition to requiring Bayer to pay $14
million, the settlement required the company to report a new pricing
benchmark that prosecutors hoped would become an alternative to
AWP. This new pricing benchmark, called the "Average Sales Price"
(ASP), sought to reflect actual prices providers paid for prescription
drugs including all discounts, rebates, and other benefits tied to the
purchase of the drug (Bayer Corporate Integrity Agreement 2001:1115). Because the ASP, unlike the AWP, was a defined term and set by
actual market prices rather than by the manufacturer, this was
intended to reduce price "manipulation" by the pharmaceutical
industry.
In addition to establishing a new pricing system that
prosecutors hoped would serve as an alternative to AWP, the Bayer
settlement was also crucial for the way it attempted to legalize
accountability throughout the organization. The settlement required
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the company to appoint an internal compliance officer and create a
compliance committee tasked with monitoring Bayer's day-to-day
adherence to the settlement's regulatory terms. The committee was
required to create new written codes of conduct detailing the internal
procedures Bayer would take to comply with the agreement (Bayer
Corporate Integrity Agreement 2001:4). In addition, the settlement
required specific training and educational programs for employees to
ensure compliance. While the settlement placed responsibility of
implementing these provisions on the company, all of the company's
actions were subject to enhanced oversight by the federal government
(ibid: 29).
The government prosecutors viewed the Bayer settlement as a
watershed agreement that could prompt the replacement of the
existing AWP system with the "more accurate" ASP system. New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer characterized the settlement as "a
significant victory...[that] sends a strong message to other
pharmaceutical manufacturers and health care providers that we will
not allow them to enrich themselves at the expense of taxpayers and
those most in need" (Pear 2001). This "strong message" resonated
across the industry, as Bayer became the first domino to fall in the
government prosecutors' strategy to attack the AWP reimbursement
system.
Following the Bayer settlement was an even more significant
agreement later in 2001, which involved TAP Pharmaceuticals and its
cancer drug, Lupron. As with the Bayer case, government prosecutors
claimed that TAP's marketing the spread represented illegal fraud
under the FCA. TAP disputed these allegations, but the threat of a
corporate "death sentence" helped federal and state prosecutors to
achieve a $875 million settlement with TAP, the largest health care
fraud settlement in history to that time (Department of Justice 2001).
Much like the Bayer settlement, the TAP agreement sought to legalize
accountability by forcing the creation of internal oversight provisions.
It also required TAP to enter into an agreement with HHS requiring
government oversight of the company's marketing and sales practices
for seven years, the first settlement to require this sort of scrutiny.
Perhaps most importantly, the settlement required TAP to report the
ASP for each of its drugs on a quarterly basis, similar to the provision
the prosecutors had won in the Bayer settlement. The settlement
permitted the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), an
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agency within HHS, to rely upon this ASP data in setting
reimbursement rates for TAP's products under Medicare. It also
allowed state Medicaid programs to use ASPs to set their own
reimbursements rates (TAP Corporate Integrity Agreement 2001:1011).
The prosecutors' bargaining in the shadow of the law proved to
be a powerful method of policy-making for two important reasons.
First, unlike policies created through typical policy making or
regulatory processes, the new corporate responsibilities couched in
these agreements were largely immune from judicial review. This was
a particularly important benefit given the uncertain legal ground upon
which the threatened Bayer and TAP lawsuits rested. The contention
that AWP was "fraudulent" faced a number of legal problems, including
the fact that health care providers, and not pharmaceutical firms, were
the direct beneficiaries of the AWP spread. The government had also
long known that AWP really meant "Ain't What's Paid" – and even
explicitly maintained AWP as a way to ensure that physicians and
other providers were adequately compensated by the Medicare and
Medicaid programs. However, by lodging their regulation of the
pharmaceutical industry in out-of-court settlements, prosecutors
simultaneously leveraged judicial power to force new regulations while
insulating these regulations from judicial review.
Second, these settlements were largely self-implementing since
they did not rely upon third parties – courts and judges – to enforce
organizational change. Because new corporate responsibilities were
lodged in an "agreement," it was easier to obtain immediate buy-in on
the part of the regulated industry. Enforcement then proceeded along
two tracks: legalized accountability through instituting internal
mechanisms of compliance along with increased oversight by the
government parties to the agreement. These enforcement mechanisms
helped sidestep the oft-cited problem that courts lack enforcement
capabilities necessary to effectuate widespread change because they
have neither the power of sword nor the purse (Rosenberg 1991,
2008).

Expanding the Scope of AWP Litigation
Critical to the government litigators' efforts to change
organizational culture and policy on a national scale was their ability to
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draw in additional participants to the conflict over pharmaceutical
prices. Prosecutors stood at the center of an emerging fight about drug
industry practices, providing an arena for the socialization of conflict
pertaining to a once obscure issue seemingly of interest mainly to
health care providers. This role was particularly important given that
advocates for industry reform were losing in traditional policy-making
venues. Coming on the heels of failed legislative attempts to reform
drug pricing practices, the watershed Bayer and TAP settlements
served as a major "wake up call" to the industry (Pharmaceutical Law
& Industry Report 2001) and as a prototype for a subsequent wave of
lawsuits by state-level public prosecutors as well as private classaction litigators.

The Expansion of State Litigation
Following the Bayer and TAP settlements, AGs from across the
nation pursued their own state-level AWP claims against drug
companies. Texas AG John Cornyn filed the first individual state AWP
lawsuit in the fall of 2000, alleging that three pharmaceutical firms had
inflated the AWP for asthma inhalants and marketed the spread to
pharmacists (Appleby 2000). Several other AGs soon followed with
increasingly expansive claims of their own. For example, Nevada AG
Frankie Sue Del Papa's lawsuit in early 2002 not only named a dozen
defendants but also contained a variety of Medicaid fraud, antitrust,
and consumer protection claims (Elfin 2002). Del Papa's complaint also
repeatedly referred to the pharmaceutical companies' behavior as part
of a "racketeering enterprise" and an "AWP Scheme," an attempt to
coin negative labels for pricing behavior that had for decades been
part of the government's reimbursement system. Del Papa noted that
the breadth of her complaint, which also sought a redefinition of AWP,
"has nationwide applications because of its similarities to the historic
tobacco litigation in which the states eventually recovered billions of
dollars" (ibid).
The quantity of litigation expanded from these early state
efforts, both in terms of the number of states involved in bringing
lawsuits as well as the number of defendants targeted by the lawsuits.
Table 1 indicates the progression of these state lawsuits over time.2
[Table 1 about here]
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State prosecutors collaborated closely on these cases. The key
organizational mechanism was the Pharmaceutical Task Force
established in 2002 under the auspices of the National Association of
Attorneys General. The goal of this Task Force was to encourage
communication and collaboration among the states, federal
enforcement agencies, and the private bar. In addition to serving as
an information clearinghouse for AGs bringing their own lawsuits, the
Task Force served as an umbrella under which several multistate
lawsuits against the pharmaceutical industry proceeded (Cutler 2003).

Collaborations with Federal Agencies, Private Litigators, and
Advocacy Groups
Throughout the expanding AWP litigation campaign, state and
federal prosecutors worked closely with other institutional insiders
within the federal government, particularly attorneys in the Office of
the Inspector General within HHS. Because HHS helps to administer
government health care programs through its Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency served as a crucial partner
for government prosecutors. In particular, prosecutors' legal
settlements pertaining to AWP typically require the settling company
to enter Corporate Integrity Agreements with HHS, which allow the
agency to monitor the company's compliance with its new corporate
responsibilities and grant it the authority to exclude non-compliant
companies from government health care programs.
While prosecutors benefited from the assistance provided by
institutional insiders within HHS to help enforce the new legal
requirements they sought, the agency also benefited from these
collaborations by gaining additional powers resulting from the
prosecutors' settlements – powers that often went beyond the explicit
authority established by Congress. For example, the TAP settlement
not only granted the agency additional powers to oversee TAP's
corporate operations, but it allowed CMS to rely upon the settlementgenerated ASP data in setting reimbursement rates for TAP's products
under Medicare and Medicaid. This was despite Congress's previous
enactment of the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Benefits Improvement
and Protection Act of 2000, which, among other things, precluded the
agency from "directly or indirectly decreas[ing] the rates or
reimbursement...under the current reimbursement methodology." This
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dynamic, in which government agencies assist prosecutors'
mobilization of the law as a way to empower themselves, bears
similarities to other ways in which agencies have supported the growth
of the "litigation state" as a way to bolster bureaucratic capacity
(Farhang 2010).
In addition to allying with institutional insiders, prosecutors also
collaborated closely with outside groups. Among the most important
collaborations were those between state-level public prosecutors and
private plaintiffs' lawyers. As AWP litigation spread across the country,
AGs hired private attorneys on a contingency fee basis to handle many
of the states' tactical litigation decisions, including drafting legal briefs
and crafting settlement provisions. Owing to the complexity of the
AWP litigation, states drew from a common pool of private class action
lawyers with particular expertise in pharmaceutical law. One plaintiffs'
firm in particular, Hagens Berman, handled much of the day-to-day
litigation for several of the states joining the campaign against drug
companies.3 This coordination with a small pool of plaintiffs' lawyers
had the effect of both harmonizing the "AWP-as-fraud" narrative and
providing private attorneys with additional resources they could later
use in private class-action litigation.
The initial federal and state prosecutions also served as a model
for separate private class action lawsuits brought by advocacy groups
with similar goals in mind. Pharmaceutical industry critics had long
been active in the fight against high drug costs, but had focused their
activism in legislative and regulatory avenues until the landmark Bayer
and TAP settlements. These settlements opened up litigation as a
promising new avenue for advocacy groups seeking reform of
pharmaceutical pricing. In April 2001, a few months after the Bayer
settlement, a coalition of various unions, non-profit health care
organizations, and progressive advocacy groups formed the
Prescription Access Litigation project (PAL). The coalition aimed to
coordinate litigation with the purpose of "working to end illegal
pharmaceutical industry practices and fighting for more affordable
drug prices" (Prescription Access Litigation). Operating as a project of
Community Catalyst, a national advocacy organization for consumer
rights in the healthcare system, PAL was not hesitant to explain the
policy-oriented purpose of their lawsuits:
The longer-term goal [of PAL's class action lawsuits] is to put a
halt to drug company practices that keep the cost of drugs high.
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The lawsuits will move the issue of access to prescription drugs
to the forefront of the public eye. Historically, class action
lawsuits have been a vehicle to encourage legislative leaders to
take action on a particular policy issue. It is our hope that the
actions of the PAL initiative will persuade state and
Congressional legislative leaders to address the high price of
prescription drugs and the problems many people experience in
obtaining needed medications (Prescription Access Litigation).
In December 2001, two months after the announcement of the
prosecutors' TAP settlement, the PAL coalition filed a major classaction lawsuit in Massachusetts against 28 drug companies. Most of
the defendants in this lawsuit were already under investigation by
federal and state prosecutors, which the class action complaint was
quick to note. For each of the defendants, which included both TAP
and Bayer, the complaint prominently stated that these companies had
"been the target of government investigations" and included
information drawn from these investigations as part of the narrative of
criminal complicity that the complaint was attempting to build
(Complaint, In Re Pharmaceutical Industry:39). The complaint also
contained language similar to that in the prosecutors' earlier
complaints, including characterizations of AWP as an "industry-wide
scheme" to defraud those paying for prescription drugs (Complaint, In
Re Pharmaceutical Industry: 1). The similarity of legal language was
aided by the fact that many of the same private class-action firms that
had been retained by AGs were also hired by members of the PAL
coalition, which further coordinated tactics among the different
elements of the anti-AWP coalition.4
In addition to targeting the same industry defendants as the
government prosecutors, the goals of the litigation were very similar.
Much as the prosecutors sought "nothing less than changing the way
the industry does business" (Guiden 2001), the activist groups sought
to use class-action litigation to force a "system change" in how the
pharmaceutical industry sold their products (Gold and Caffrey 2002).
Given this shared focus on similar public policy goals, it is not
surprising that the lawsuits filed by the PAL coalition built directly upon
the "AWP-as-fraud" frame developed by the government prosecutions.
The similarities between the lawsuits brought by prosecutors and
members of the PAL coalition resulted in several of the AGs' lawsuits
being consolidated with PAL's in federal court (In Re Pharmaceutical
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Industry). AWP litigation continues to this day, and public and private
plaintiffs have reached dozens of settlements with pharmaceutical
company defendants.

The Power of Prosecutors as a Coalition Leader
As initiators of the AWP litigation, prosecutors led a broader
coalition of cause lawyers that now includes agency lawyers, advocacy
groups, and the private bar. As Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold
have described them, cause lawyers share a commitment to "altering
some aspect of the social, economic, and political status quo"
(1998:4). Despite this broad formulation, studies of cause lawyering
have shared an emphasis on "bottom-up" studies of legal mobilization
by focusing on the actions of "outsider" lawyers, reflecting the view
that "cause lawyering is everywhere a deviant strain within the legal
profession" (Sarat & Scheingold 1998:3). The NAACP's campaign
against segregated education remains the classic example of cause
lawyering, though studies have also examined cause lawyering for the
poor, gays and lesbians, consumers, and evangelicals (Sarat &
Scheingold 2006). These studies situate cause lawyers as actors
outside and opposed to the state who use legal processes to force
changes to the political status quo. Law-based reform groups such as
PAL, as an explicitly political "outsider" consumer advocacy group,
appear to fit the typical model of cause lawyers well.
Government prosecutors are in some ways the consummate
"insiders," since their typical role is to use the law to carry out the
interests of the state. Nevertheless, the litigation campaigns described
in this article suggest that prosecutors occupy a more complicated
position in the legal community. Through innovative interpretations of
ambiguous civil and criminal law, prosecutors have employed their
legal resources as leverage to achieve political changes that other
parts of the state have declined to make. In this way, they act as
"insiders" within the state that are nevertheless positioned against the
state. Despite their insider status, they seek very similar goals as the
advocacy group allies with whom they frequently collaborate. Beyond
providing "elite support" for these outsider groups, government
prosecutors have taken a leadership role in litigation campaigns such
as that against the pharmaceutical industry.

Law & Social Inquiry, Vol 40, No. 1 (Winter 2015): pg. 123-151. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley.

20

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

The characterization of government prosecutors as akin to
"cause lawyers" is not to suggest that widespread change of the
political status quo was their only motivation. After all, pharmaceutical
industry settlements generated a great deal of money for the
government, and many of the prosecutors involved, at least at the
state level, were elected officials for whom electoral considerations
undoubtedly loomed large. With that caveat in mind, however, the
similarity between the explicit political reform goals of government
prosecutors and outside activists is difficult to dismiss. While these
goals likely mixed with other more self-interested motives, such
motivational complexity is likely true of most cause lawyering.5
Although private class action litigators often argue that their litigation
seeks justice for clients who would otherwise be without a voice,
monetary considerations also influence whether these actors bring
litigation. Likewise, the existence of various motivations for
government attorneys to engage in legal mobilization ought not to
obscure that a commitment to "altering some aspect of the social,
economic, and political status quo" was a central concern for these
prosecutors – a motivation recognized by the advocates who partnered
with prosecutors to mobilize the law for political change.
Indeed, the government lawyers' position as advocates for the
"public interest" offered them unique advantages as cause lawyers
that helped them serve as a vanguard for a broader movement. For
one, by suggesting that they were merely "enforcing the law" against
rogue drug companies, government attorneys created what Eugene
Lewis termed an "apolitical shield" around activities that are actually
very much political (Lewis 1980:17-18). The apolitical shield possessed
by law enforcers made it more difficult for pharmaceutical industry
defendants to claim that the legal attack they faced was motivated by
a group with an ideological axe to grind.
Prosecutors also brought significant institutional resources to
this litigation. In Galanter's oft-cited terminology (1974), prosecutors
are repeat players with advantages over private one-shotters who
attempt to use litigation as an instrument of reform. Most importantly,
prosecutors offer important elements of "standing" in two senses of
the word. First, their position as advocates for the "public interest"
provide them legal standing unavailable to private litigators, allowing
them to access court by connecting allegations of pharmaceutical
"fraud" to direct harm to their ostensible client, the American
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taxpayer. Second, they have standing in the sense of "having a voice
in the media" (Ferree, et al. 2002, 86). As respected law enforcement
personnel, prosecutors are better positioned to gain the attention and
sympathies of the mass media. In an American society undergoing a
broader turn to "governing through crime" (Simon 2008; McCann,
Haltom & Fisher 2013) and in which "popular entertainment celebrates
such enforcers of criminal law" (McCann, Haltom & Fisher 2013:12)
government prosecutors are in a strong position to gain media
standing unavailable to private litigators and thus exert meaningful
pressure through their legal mobilization campaigns.

Establishing New Legal Norms: The Broader Framing
Effects of Litigation
At the start of the prosecutors' AWP litigation campaign,
legislative efforts to control the price of drugs faced significant
constraints in part because they operated under frames that were
unfavorable given the political context. Particularly after Republicans
won control of Congress in the 1994 elections, the conservative
congressional majority was unlikely to be moved by calls to "combat
corporate greed" through price controls the industry viewed as an
unwarranted intervention into the free market. Further, health care
providers gave lawmakers a compelling frame of the AWP system as a
necessary way to compensate them for losses they incurred providing
other services under Medicare and Medicaid. These existing frames,
bolstered by decades of AWP's persistence, appeared to provide a
strong rationale for AWP's continued existence in the 1990s.
As law enforcement actors, prosecutors used their position to
shift the frame surrounding these longstanding drug pricing practices.
Throughout the litigation was an attempt to replace the positive frame
of AWP as a necessary part of the Medicare and Medicaid system with
a negative frame of AWP as "fraud" by lawbreaking pharmaceutical
companies. It was no coincidence that prosecutors' legal complaints
characterized the existing payment system as an "AWP Scheme" and
part of a "racketeering enterprise." Prosecutors also employed the
media to advance these negative frames following settlements by
issuing coordinated press releases containing frames of corporate
malfeasance.6 This strategy shares much in common with activists'
efforts to criminalize Big Tobacco beginning in the 1990s (McCann,
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Haltom & Fisher 2013). As with the tobacco litigation, litigation against
pharmaceutical companies followed a "crimtort" model involving a
hybrid of civil and criminal legal claims that was part of a broader
effort to criminalize previously accepted corporate behavior (Koenig &
Rustad 1998; McCann, Haltom & Fisher 2013).
A significant aspect of this re-framing of AWP as "fraud" is that
it appealed across the political spectrum, which was particularly
important in an era in which conservative Republicans were ascendant
in various policy-making arenas. Many liberal critics of "Big Pharma"
had little problem viewing the AWP system as another example of
corporate greed within the drug industry. Yet this re-framing also
appealed to conservatives who seized upon the AWP system as
another example of waste, fraud, and abuse in burgeoning federal
social programs. Republicans praised legislative efforts to encourage
state AWP lawsuits against drug companies, for example, as a way to
help U.S. taxpayers "recover the billions of dollars stolen through fraud
every year" (151 Cong. 31 Oct. 2005:12069). As Senator John McCain
(R-AZ) put it, pharmaceutical pricing "fraud" was another example of
"wasteful and unnecessary" government spending (151 Cong. 20 Dec.
2005:14073). Helping advance this anti-government "waste" frame
was the fact that the coalition of prosecutors litigating against drug
companies included a bipartisan group of Republican and Democratic
AGs as well as George W. Bush's Department of Justice.
Prosecutors, at least those on the state level, were also able to
draw upon their status as the legal representatives of their states in a
way that provided them an advantageous position. Scholars have
noted how the conservative shift in the courts beginning in the 1970s,
which continued through the Supreme Court's "federalism revolution"
in the 1990s, resulted in a judiciary more sympathetic to state-based
legal claims. The courts' sympathies to "states' rights" helped state
litigators find more success across a broad range of legal claims
(Waltenburg & Swinford 1999). By characterizing drug pricing reform
as a crucial issue for the states, the AGs' legal mobilization was
compatible with frames held in a positive light by judicial actors,
thereby providing more plausibility to threats of litigation.
The prosecutors' framing contributed to shifts in the political
landscape as Congress and the courts gradually accepted the new legal
understanding of AWP advocated by government prosecutors. After
years of refusing to change the AWP formula for drug reimbursements,
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Congress began shifting its posture following the success of the Bayer
and TAP settlements and the wave of state litigation that followed.
Building upon the existing federal and state investigations, an
increasing number of members of Congress decided to respond with
their own investigations (Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report 2003:
711). Indeed, key congressional committees sought and incorporated
information from these lawsuits as part of their own investigations
(Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report 2004b: 604). A few months
after the Bayer settlement and in the midst of the TAP investigation
and increasing state litigation, Congress held its first hearing to
discuss problems with the AWP system. The very title of the hearing
was revealing, as it characterized the AWP "a broken system for
patients and taxpayers" despite only months earlier requiring the
Medicare system to keep using the AWP benchmark and prohibiting
any alternatives (107 Cong. 21 Sept. 2001). Following this first
hearing in 2001, the number of congressional committees examining
the issue proliferated.7 Congress invited prosecutors to testify about
their lawsuits and explain how drug companies committed "fraud" in
their state Medicaid programs (108 Cong. 7 Dec. 2004).
Following the TAP settlement in 2001, one industry attorney
remarked, "Three or four years ago, if you surveyed manufacturers
and asked if AWPs were kickbacks, they'd have looked at you like you
were from another planet" (Carter 2002:44). By 2003, the terms of
the debate had changed to such an extent that Congress reversed its
decades-long support for AWP and began seeking alternatives for the
system. In December 2003, Congress addressed the issue of
prescription drug reimbursements in the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA). The MMA moved to end
AWP as the baseline for reimbursement rates in the newly created
Medicare Part D program as well as for prescription drugs already
provided under the program. In the place of AWP, now described as a
"flawed" system, Congress adopted precisely the same pricing
benchmark developed as part of the TAP and Bayer settlements – the
"Average Sales Price." The MMA borrowed the definition of ASP directly
from the settlements, defining it as an average of the actual final sales
prices of the drugs including all rebates and other discounts. Congress
also required companies participating in the Medicare program to
report the ASPs for their drugs to CMS on a quarterly basis, similar to
the provisions previously achieved in the Bayer and TAP settlements.
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In essence, these congressional changes were acquiescing to the
national changes in pharmaceutical pricing that government
prosecutors were already achieving, settlement by settlement, through
their litigation.
Law Enforcement as Legal Mobilization beyond the AWP
Context
As public policy and organizational scholars have long noted,
organizations learn from their experiences (March and Olsen 1979;
Baumgartner and Jones 2002). Positive feedback reinforces future
activity, creating public policy cascades in which "each change begets
another even larger change" (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 139).
Similarly, social movement scholars have noted how movement
strategies often migrate from one setting to another as "the
dissemination of ideas and models…cause actors to perceive new
possibilities or imperatives for action" (Davis et al 2005:53; Minkoff
1997). The success of the NAACP's civil rights litigation in Brown v.
Board of Education, for example, provided a signal to other social
movement groups that the judiciary was willing to consider their
claims, leading these groups to emulate the NAACP's legal strategies
(Meyer & Boutcher 2007). These notions of policy feedback effects and
diffusion processes help to explain the development of mechanisms
that might have been unusual and limited to one setting at one time
but have since become commonplace across a variety of contexts.
These dynamics capture what has become an emerging model
of government litigation that began with the tobacco litigation and has
spread to several other policy contexts. Linking these campaigns is the
coordinated efforts to force organizational reform through global
settlements, expand the scope of the conflict with various other
groups, and establish new legal norms in an effort to fundamentally
shape the practices of entire national industries. This differs from the
typical role of government attorneys as defending the policy status
quo from law-based attempts to change it by outsider movements or
to "enforcing the law" against individual law-breakers in a reactive, ad
hoc fashion.
The lineage for this sort of legal mobilization traces to the
previously mentioned tobacco litigation that settled just as the
government's drug pricing investigations were beginning to unfold.
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Like the pharmaceutical pricing settlements, the tobacco settlement
was important not only because of the large amount of money
involved, but also because it served to place various restrictions and
requirements on the industry that anti-tobacco advocates had long
sought from Congress. The successful resolution of the tobacco
litigation illustrated a couple of crucial aspects that have helped lead to
this emerging model of coordinated government-led legal mobilization.
First, it illustrated the power of "law enforcement" in getting results
that private litigation could not. Facing coordinated, high-profile
investigations by law enforcers willing to label widespread industry
practices as "fraudulent," companies would be willing to settle for
massive fines and agree to new regulations. Second, this process
introduced a powerful policy-making alternative to legislation. The MSA
rose from the ashes of failed attempts to regulate the industry through
congressional statute, mirroring many of the regulations that had
never been more than proposals in Congress. In short, governmentled legal mobilization could be a powerful way of achieving policy
changes even when efforts in other venues have failed. Below I
provide three additional areas in which law enforcement as legal
mobilization has been similarly prominent.

Pharmaceutical Marketing
For one, the ongoing drug pricing litigation campaign represents
only a part of the broader government-led attack on pharmaceutical
industry practices. One of the fastest growing areas of government
litigation against the drug industry involves use of lawsuits and
settlements to reshape drug marketing. Most importantly, prosecutors
have used the False Claims Act and other federal and state statutes to
limit the ability of drug firms to promote the "off label" use of their
products. While federal law does not explicitly allow pharmaceutical
firms to promote uses of their products beyond those approved by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Congress in the late 1990s
enacted the Food and Drug Modernization Act making it legal for drug
firms to provide doctors with "neutral information" about the off-label
uses of their drugs, including peer-reviewed scientific studies. This
controversial change was a blow to industry critics who argued that
such deregulation of industry practices posed risks to public health and
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threatened to subvert the entire system of FDA regulation (Radley,
Finkelstein & Stafford 2006).
Much as they did in the AWP context, prosecutors followed
losses by industry critics in Congress by initiating a litigation campaign
that attempted to force organizational change through lawsuits and
settlements. The spark for this legal mobilization was an investigation
of Pfizer's marketing of its epilepsy drug, Neurontin. Relying upon an
innovative interpretation of the False Claims Act and state consumer
protection statutes, prosecutors suggested that when Pfizer
disseminated information to doctors about the off-label uses of the
drug, it constituted illegal and "fraudulent" off-label marketing. Despite
the untested nature of these claims, as well as the firm's insistence
that the prosecutors were seeking to penalize truthful speech
protected by the First Amendment, Pfizer agreed to a $430 million
settlement in May 2004. In addition to the fine, the settlement
contained regulatory provisions and mechanisms of legalized
accountability similar to those in the AWP settlements (Pharmaceutical
Law & Industry Report 2004a: 534).
The Neurontin settlement served as a way to expand the scope
of the conflict by drawing in additional attacks on pharmaceutical
industry marketing practices. Following the Neurontin settlement, AG
and class action litigation alleging off-label marketing fraud
proliferated. Litigation has continued to the present, with drug firms
collectively paying billions in fines and agreeing to various new
corporate requirements (Osborn 2013). As with the AWP case,
prosecutors also worked closely with federal agency lawyers on these
cases. A particularly important partner has been the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), which has seen its power to oversee
pharmaceutical marketing increase because of the investigations
(Pagano 2009).
The prosecutors' mobilization of the law against the prescription
drug industry was also an attempt to establish new legal norms by
"sending a message" that would resonate throughout the industry.
While legal settlements in this and other contexts do not create formal
legal precedents, they can prove invaluable in creating "business
precedents" informally shaping the corporate landscape. The
establishment of these business precedents led to the pharmaceutical
industry's peak association adopting new voluntary guidelines,
mirrored after recent settlements, aiming to help avoid liability for its
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members (Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report 2007: 16). Several
individual companies also announced reforms to their advertising
practices to help them avoid future liability (Arnold 2008).

Gun Control
Another prominent effort of government litigators to use
lawsuits and settlements to reshape the political status quo, coming
directly in the wake of the tobacco settlement of 1998, was in the area
of gun control. In October of 1998, attorneys representing the city of
New Orleans filed a complaint against several gun manufacturers
alleging that they defectively designed their handguns because they
lacked safeguards preventing gun use by children or criminals (Morial
v. Smith & Wesson Corp.). Shortly after, city attorneys for Chicago
filed a lawsuit claiming that gun manufacturers had created a "public
nuisance" by designing, manufacturing, marketing, and supplying their
products in a way enabling a black market for illegal firearms within
the Chicago city limits (Butterfield 1998).
These two city lawsuits opened a floodgate of subsequent
lawsuits against the gun industry, with over thirty municipalities
eventually filing suit (Violence Policy Center). Government attorneys
beyond the local level soon after joined the litigation campaign. In
1999, Eliot Spitzer and Richard Blumenthal, the AGs of New York and
Connecticut respectively, began investigations of several gun
manufacturers. Andrew Cuomo, Clinton's Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), began working on a legal strategy
mirroring many of the city lawsuits, alleging that gun manufacturers
had not been properly supervising their distribution channels and had
otherwise failed to promote gun safety (Walsh 1999). In December
1999, President Clinton and Secretary Cuomo jointly announced that
they were planning a lawsuit against gun manufacturers on behalf of
3,200 public housing authorities across the country, based upon the
notion that the actions of the gun manufacturers had increased federal
expenditures (Stout & Perez-Pena 1999).
The gun control litigation, like other recent nationwide litigation
campaigns, aimed to force organizational change in the firearms
industry. As New Orleans Mayor Marc Morial stated at the time:
"money is not our primary aim. Changing the behavior and the
practice of the gun industry is" (Koch 1999). Government prosecutors
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used a variety of coordinated legal strategies to achieve a settlement
seeking legalized accountability and requiring "more stringent
regulation in an effort to keep guns out of the wrong hands" (Barrett
2000). In March 2000, several of the public litigators reached a major
settlement with Smith & Wesson, the largest manufacturer of
handguns in the industry. The settlement contained numerous
provisions relating to firearms safety and design, as well as several
concerning the company's sales, marketing, and distribution practices.
It also contained several provisions aimed at ensuring compliance,
including requirements that the company designate a compliance
officer tasked with ensuring adherence with the terms of the
agreement (Smith & Wesson Settlement 2000:III(c)(1)-(3)).
Second, the public gun litigation served to expand the scope of
the conflict in a context in which advocates for stricter gun control
were losing in other venues. Particularly after Republicans won control
of Congress in the 1994 elections, federal gun control legislation faced
little prospects for success. This litigation campaign served as an
alternative way to achieve gun control policies. Like other campaigns,
this conflict featured similar alliances between government litigators
and federal bureaucracies, with state and local litigators working
closely with HUD to achieve what the Clinton Administration and other
gun control advocates had failed to achieve through legislative
channels. Further, several private class-action attorneys and interest
groups, often working in conjunction with government litigators, also
sought to use litigation to control the gun industry. The Brady Center
to Prevent Handgun Violence, a leading pro-gun control interest group,
joined most of the city lawsuits against the gun industry and assisted
the State of New York in its gun industry litigation (Tyler 1999). The
Castano Group, a coalition of dozens of private class-action law firms
that had worked with AGs on the tobacco litigation, also worked
closely with public prosecutors (ibid).
Finally, the gun litigation campaign was an attempt to establish
new legal norms. Similar to what occurred in the tobacco litigation, the
gun lawsuits framed industry actions as deceptive behavior that posed
a threat to public health and budgets. This had some initial effects on
the broader legal landscape. Prior to 1999, no private lawsuits had
ever found a gun manufacturer liable for the criminal use of firearms.
In February 1999, however, only a few months after the initial city
lawsuits, a federal jury did just that. In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, a jury in
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New York found 15 of the 25 manufacturers named in the suit liable
under a "negligent marketing" theory, imposing damages on three of
those companies. Several of the government lawsuits that went to trial
following the Smith & Wesson settlement achieved at least some initial
successes as well (City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. 2002).
Ultimately, however, this campaign failed to be the key turning
point in the gun control debate as it initially appeared. A swift and
overwhelmingly negative response from Smith & Wesson's customer
base and the National Rifle Association prompted Smith & Wesson to
back away from its agreement, and Congress enacted the Protection of
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of 2005 prohibiting most litigation
against the gun industry. Despite its ultimate failure, however, this
government-led litigation campaign illustrated a dynamic similar to
other recent attempts to use government litigation to reshape
corporate practices.

Reform of Mortgage Lending Practices
In 2000, AGs began investigating several mortgage lenders for
allegedly engaging in "predatory lending" that targeted lower-income,
elderly, and minority communities. These practices had long been the
target of activists who had claimed that these loans acted as a
financial trap for the most vulnerable citizens, turning the American
dream into a nightmare. While only a few states specifically had antipredatory lending statutes on the books (Davenport 2003), state
prosecutors suggested that practices in the subprime market might
nevertheless violate the broad and vaguely worded prohibition of
"unfair and deceptive acts" under general state consumer protection
law.
Despite the uncertainty of whether the lenders' conduct was
actually illegal under existing law, the government litigators used their
combined threat of widespread legal liability to leverage major
settlements with members of industry aimed at forcing organizational
change. In 2002, the government coalition, now joined by all fifty
states, reached a $484 million settlement with mortgage giant
Household Finance. The settlement required the company to adhere to
several strict lending requirements, including limitations on
prepayment penalties, new required consumer disclosures, and various
other prohibitions and regulations. The settlement also sought
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legalized accountability by establishing an "independent monitor" to
oversee Household's compliance with the settlement and requiring
employee training to ensure compliance with the agreement
(Household Finance Consent Judgment 2002:24-28). These
requirements went beyond anything required by the federal
government or most states, effectively nationalizing many of the
regulations similar to those industry critics unsuccessfully sought
through state and federal legislative channels. These early efforts
served as the framework for later settlements with the largest national
lenders, including a $325 million settlement with Ameriquest and a
landmark $8.68 billion settlement with Countrywide Financial
(Ameriquest Multistate Settlement 2006:36-39; Countrywide
Stipulated Judgment and Injunction 2008:22). In February 2012,
federal and state prosecutors reached a $26 billion settlement with the
nation's five largest mortgage servicers, which represented the largest
single legal settlement since the tobacco settlement. The settlement,
which sought to end "robo-signing" practices in the mortgage industry,
continued the trend of requiring companies to adopt new training
procedures and regulatory requirements to prevent activities not
clearly illegal under existing law (National Foreclosure Consent
Judgment 2012).
The government litigation campaign also helped to expand the
scope of the conflict. State and federal prosecutors created new
national committees and working groups focused on lending issues
throughout the 2000s, which served as a coordination mechanism not
only for prosecutors but for numerous other interests as well. The
Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force created in 2009, for example,
has served as a centralized entity coordinating enforcement efforts,
training programs, and fraud data collection among numerous
government agencies, consumer groups, legal aid attorneys, and
others (Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force 2010). Additionally,
private class-action litigation alleging lending abuses has used
investigations by state litigators as part of building a narrative of
criminal complicity, similar to the pharmaceutical litigation
(Ameriquest Settlement Agreement 2009:4-5).
Finally, the campaign has also helped to establish new legal
norms concerning what constitutes "predatory lending." The legislative
debate about bank regulation had proceeded along polarized frames of
consumer welfare versus government interference with the free
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market. Government prosecutors sought to re-frame the regulations
achieved through settlements as necessary to "enforce the law"
against lawbreaking corporate giants, which, as with reconceptualizing existing business practices as "fraudulent" in the
pharmaceutical context, was a more acceptable way to achieve
expanded government regulation than the existing polarized debate.
The ambiguity of "predatory lending" granted government prosecutors
the chance to shape its meaning through mobilizing the law against
leading firms in the lending industry. The changing legal environment
helped bolster legislative efforts to address lending practices. For
example, California enacted a "Homeowner Bill of Rights" that
incorporated and built upon the provisions in the government
prosecutors' mortgage industry settlement in February 2012. This
legislation applies the settlement's provisions to banks and other
lenders not party to the original settlement (Lifsher & Lazo 2012).
Additionally, recent congressional statutes and regulations targeting
mortgage lending practices codified elements of previous settlements
as a way of setting a federal floor for regulatory practices (Reckard
2013).

Conclusion
Government litigation campaigns have proliferated in recent
years and present several themes of interest to scholars of law and
politics. These campaigns illustrate that legal mobilization is not only a
way for political outsiders to challenge the state, but also serves as a
powerful policy-making tool used by actors inside the state. Far from
simply "enforcing the law," prosecutors have employed the
instrumental and constitutive power of the law to force changes in
organizational practices, expand the scope of the conflict over
corporate responsibilities, and reshape existing legal norms through
lawsuits and settlements. These activities illustrate how attention to
legal processes unfolding across multiple political institutions can
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the role of law in
social and political change.
Further, the prevalence of government-led legal mobilization
shows few signs of abating. Reflecting several parallel trends in
American politics, private reform groups have increasingly collaborated
with public litigators to mobilize the law. Intensifying political
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polarization and congressional gridlock have made traditional policy
making more difficult, leading advocates to seek policy change in other
venues. At the same time, however, private litigators have found it
increasingly difficult to access the legal system as Congress and the
Supreme Court have curtailed opportunities for private litigators to sue
corporations.
In this political environment, prosecutors are a promising
avenue for challenges to the status quo. As repeat players tasked with
representing the "public interest," these institutional insiders maintain
privileged access to the courts. Further, by couching widespread
political changes in the apolitical language of law enforcement,
prosecutors have gained support from across the 1 The following
analysis of the Average Wholesale Price (AWP) case relies heavily upon
the author's cataloguing of government lawsuits and settlements
targeting the pharmaceutical industry. The main resource used for
compiling this information was the Lexis-Nexis "United States News
Verdicts, Settlements & Decisions" database. For each year from 1980
to 2012, the following search string was used: [("average wholesale
price" or AWP or ((drug! or pharmaceutical!) w/2 pric!)) and (litigation
or "settlement & compromise" or "suits & claims" or verdicts or
"decisions & rulings" or "consent decrees & orders" or investigations)].
Additional information about AWP litigation was collected as
political system for changes that would otherwise be controversial.
Given their shared goals of political change, increasingly
disadvantaged private litigators have compelling reasons to ally with
their powerful public counterparts.
All of this suggests that scholars have much to gain by granting
greater attention to the role of government law enforcement in the
process of legal mobilization. While legal actions targeting corporate
"fraud" may initially appear to have little to do with politics, especially
since they are rarely resolved by high profile Supreme Court decisions,
politics are in fact a central part of the story. Given the roadblocks to
policy reform currently existing in the contemporary American political
system, this form of legal mobilization has proven to be an
increasingly important avenue for achieving widespread change
through the law.
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Notes:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The following analysis of the Average Wholesale Price (AWP) case relies
heavily upon the author's cataloguing of government lawsuits and
settlements targeting the pharmaceutical industry. The main resource
used for compiling this information was the Lexis-Nexis "United States
News Verdicts, Settlements & Decisions" database. For each year from
1980 to 2012, the following search string was used: [("average
wholesale price" or AWP or ((drug! or pharmaceutical!) w/2 pric!)) and
(litigation or "settlement & compromise" or "suits & claims" or verdicts
or "decisions & rulings" or "consent decrees & orders" or
investigations)]. Additional information about AWP litigation was
collected as described in footnote 2 below. Following these searches,
the author obtained settlement documents for each of the cases from
the Web sites of individual AG offices as well as the federal DOJ and
HHS.
The information regarding states' AWP litigation in Table 1 was collected
from a search of the Web sites of each of the fifty states' Attorney
General offices, which typically contain a listing of legal complaints
filed and/or press releases concerning new litigation. This search was
supplemented with a search of the "All News" database within LexisNexis, starting with the terms "Average Wholesale Price" and
"Alabama" and subsequently continuing through all fifty states.
A listing of the various cases the Hagens Berman law firm has been involved
in is available on the firm's Web site, http://www.hbsslaw.com/casesand-investigations (accessed February 26, 2014).
According to PAL's Web site, this includes Hagens Berman, the same
plaintiffs' firm that has worked closely with AGs on several AWP cases
(Prescription Access Litigation).
Contained within the NAACP's broader law-based fight for racial justice was,
for example, a contest between civil rights pioneers Thurgood Marshall
and Carter Wesley for leadership in the black community (Tushnet
2005).
A press release issued by Louisiana's AG following a 2012 AWP settlement
with several drug companies provides a typical example: "I will, as
Attorney General, continue to aggressively pursue pharmaceutical
companies who defraud our Medicaid program. We are sending a
message to drug companies that their fraud will not be tolerated in
Louisiana" (Office of the Attorney General of Louisiana 2012).
Problems with AWP have been mentioned at least in passing in dozens of
congressional hearings beginning in 2001, with major hearings
discussing AWP at length occurring nearly every year since.
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Table 1: The Progression of State AWP Lawsuits
State
Texas
West Virginia
Nevada
Montana
Minnesota
New York
Connecticut
Florida
Kentucky
Massachusetts
Arkansas
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
Alabama
Illinois
Missouri
California
Mississippi
Arizona
Hawaii
South Carolina
Idaho
Utah
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana

Date Filed
September 2000
October 2001
January 2002
February 2002
June 2002
February 2003
March 2003
July 2003
September 2003
September 2003
January 2004
March 2004
March 2004
June 2004
January 2005
February 2005
May 2005
August 2005
October 2005
December 2005
April 2006
August 2006
June 2007
September 2007
October 2007
November 2008
November 2010

Defendants
Dey Laboratories, Schering-Plough, and Roxane

Schering-Plough and Abbott Labs
12 defendants
18 defendants
Pharmacia
Pharmacia and GlaxoSmithKline
7 defendants
3 defendants
5 defendants
13 defendants
4 defendants
5 defendants
13 defendants
20 defendants
73 defendants
48 defendants
Dey and Warrick
39 defendants
86 defendants
42 defendants
44 defendants
5 defendants
10 defendants
10 defendants
78 defendants
17 defendants
18 defendants
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Figure 1:
The Role of AWP in Government Prescription Drug
Reimbursements
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